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Towards the Trustworthy Development of Active
Medical Devices: A Hemodialysis Case Study
Atif Mashkoor and Miklos Biro
Abstract—The use of embedded software is advancing in
modern medical devices, so does its capabilities and complexity.
This paradigm shift brings many challenges such as an increased
rate of medical device failures due to software faults. In this letter,
we present a rigorous “correct by construction” approach for the
trustworthy development of hemodialysis machines, a sub-class
of active medical devices. We show how informal requirements
of hemodialysis machines are modeled and analyzed through a
rigorous process and suggest a generalization to a larger class of
active medical devices.
Index Terms—Formal methods, requirements modeling, ver-
ification and validation, active medical devices, hemodialysis
machines
I. INTRODUCTION
An Active Medical Device (AMD) is a health-care device
whose operation depends on a source of electrical energy or
any source of power other than that directly generated by
the human body or gravity and which acts by converting this
energy [1]. Until recently, AMDs were mostly composed of
mechanical components. However, recently embedded soft-
ware has shown to have a determining impact on the con-
sumer value of AMDs and their competitive differentiation.
Consequently, according to the latest directive 2007/47/EC of
the EU concerning medical devices [2], a stand-alone software
can also be considered as an AMD. The main reason of this
change is that software lends itself to adaptation to individual
requirements and requirements changes clearly much faster
than hardware.
As AMDs become more and more software-intensive, due to
the immaterial nature of software, their certification becomes
a crucial issue. Certification is the process to determine the
fitness of a device for public use. Despite the stringent mecha-
nisms already in place to check the quality of medical products
with respect to their safe operation, several incidents have been
reported that were caused by software faults. Sandler et al.
[3] show that more than a fourth of the recalls of defective
medical devices during the first half of 2010 were likely caused
by software problems. Furthermore, because of the increased
deployment of powerful programmable processors in medical
devices, software-related recalls are on the rise [4].
Certification regimes have responded to these issues by
proposing various medical software-related international stan-
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dards and guidelines such as IEC 62304 [5] and FDA General
Principles of Software Validation [6] or more general software-
related standards such as IEC 61508-3 [7]. The standard IEC
62304 categories medical software into three classes. Class A
software cause no injury or damage to health. Class B software
cause no serious injury to health. Finally, class C software may
cause serious injury or even death. Additionally, the standard
also describes the software documents which are required to be
produced for each class. Likewise, FDA also proposes several
guidelines for medical software development. Some of the key
documents of both IEC standards and FDA guidelines are: a
requirements specification, a detailed architecture and design
document, and an elaborated plan for early and rigorous verifi-
cation and validation (V&V) supporting all phases of software
development life cycle. Although a device manufacturer has
some flexibility in choosing V&V principles, the manufacturer
retains the ultimate responsibility for demonstrating that the
software has been proven correct.
One of the key recommendations of these standards and
guidelines is to adopt formal methods for the development of
software-intensive critical systems. The use of formal methods
is, in fact, “highly recommended” at higher Safety Integrity
Levels (SILs). The safety integrity of a system can be defined
as the probability of a safety-related system performing the
required safety function under all of the stated conditions
within a stated period of time. Highly recommended means
that if the mentioned technique or measure is not used, then
the rationale behind this choice has to be justified during safety
planning and assessment. IEC 61508-3 further states that the
confidence that can be placed in the software safety require-
ments specification, as a basis for safe software, depends on
the rigor of techniques by which the desirable properties of
the specification have been achieved.
The main contribution of this letter is to show how a
rigorous refinement-based approach can be applied to the
trustworthy development of a sub-system of Hemodialysis
(HD) machines, a sub-class of AMDs. The resulting formal
model demonstrates an example of generalization, that how
requirements can be rigorously specified and analyzed through
a chain of refinements to be represented at various abstraction
levels, to a larger class of AMDs. The approach also leads to
a software safety requirements specification that guarantees
correctness of the addressed aspects of behavior, supports
verification of the specification based on systematic analysis,
avoids intrinsic specification faults, reduces ambiguities in
specification writing, and ultimately generates programming
language code. The combined approach of requirements mod-
eling, analysis and development based on techniques such as
refinement, V&V and translation, and tools such as proof
checkers, model checkers, animation engines and code gen-
erators results in obtaining high-assurance and trustworthy
AMDs. According to IEC 62304, HD machines are charac-
terized as class C devices and the applied rigorous technique
is particularly suitable for this class of AMDs as most of its
components belong to a higher SIL.
Formal methods have been used in the past for the devel-
opment of various health-care devices such as cardiac-care
products [8], [9], [10] and infusion pumps [11], [12]. However,
the novelty of this work is that this is the first instance of the
application of formal methods for the modeling, analysis and
development of a sub-class of AMDs responsible for renal
replacement therapy. We believe that our work will inspire
the manufacturers of such systems to adopt formal paradigms
for the safe and trustworthy development of variants of this
domain.
II. METHODOLOGY
The development of embedded software for AMDs is a
complex process. The degree of complexity often leads to
an artifact that, although requires a great amount of time,
resources and attention to develop, yet proving its safe op-
eration is challenging. While guaranteeing the absence of
mistakes in a piece of software is not always possible, even the
identification of their presence is not an easy task. Traditional
quality assurance techniques like code reviews or test case
generation are also insufficient in this case due to the critical
nature of the medical domain. Additionally, the lack of domain
knowledge of software engineers makes the matter worse.
We present an approach where a system is synthesized
using an incremental refinement process synchronizing and
integrating different views and abstraction levels of the system.
The process of quality assurance is embedded in the model
development. Requirements of the system are supplied to a
refinement-based development process that rigorously checks
them for consistency and conformance. Every time a new
requirement is specified, it first undergoes an internal con-
sistency check and then, additionally, it is also confirmed with
the stakeholders whether this requirement indeed captures the
desired behavior. The stakeholders, in this way, become part
of the development process right from the start and also the
chance of an error to trickle down to the later stages of the
development process is minimized.
As shown in Figure 1, our approach for the development of
high-assurance AMDs consists of four major steps:
1) formal requirements specification,
2) verification,
3) validation, and
4) code generation.
In the requirements specification step, informal user and
system requirements are translated into a formal specification
using a rigorous method. During this process, requirements
are precisely written using mathematical and logical structures
which are amenable to formal analysis to determine their
correctness.
One of the important cornerstones of the specification
process is the representation of requirements at various ab-
straction levels using the notion of refinement. By following
this technique, requirements are easy to specify, analyze and
implement. In this style of specification writing, requirements
are incrementally added to the model until the model is
detailed enough to be effectively implemented.
Once the informal requirements have been translated into
a formal specification, the next step is to make sure that the
requirements conform to verification standards, i.e., require-
ments are consistent and verifiable. During this process, it is
determined that a specification conforms to some precisely
expressed properties that the model is intended to fulfill such
as well-definedness, invariant preservation and other safety
conditions.
According to [13], two well-established formal verification
approaches are theorem proving and model checking. While
the former refers to reasoning about defined properties using
a rigorous mathematical approach, the latter is the process
of exploration of the whole state space of a model to ver-
ify dynamic properties. Both deductive theorem proving and
model checking are important for proving the consistency
of an AMD. While theorem proving is helpful in ensuring
safety constraints of the system, model checking is effective
in verifying temporal constraints of the system such as liveness
and fairness properties.
Once a requirement is specified and verified, the next step
to consider is its validation. Validation is a process where it
is established by examination and provision of objective evi-
dence that the stakeholders’ requirements have been captured
correctly and completely in the requirements specification
document. Verification alone is not sufficient to guarantee
correctness of the model because it does not check whether the
specification documents the requirements from the viewpoints
of stakeholders.
In order to make stakeholders understand the formal spec-
ification, we propose to animate the specification. Animation
is a process to demonstrate the fundamental operations of a
specification using a dynamic and interactive graphical display.
This technique is very well-suited for making a quick mental
image of the model even for non-technical domain experts.
The last step of the formal development process is the trans-
lation of the requirements specification into programmable
code. The last refinement step of the specification writing
process is, in fact, already very detailed and close to the
implementation stage. An automatic code generation utility
capable of translating a formal specification into the target
language code such as [14] or [15] can be used at this step.
III. CASE STUDY: HEMODIALYSIS MACHINES
For the experimental validation of our approach, we apply
our approach to a HD machine case study [16]. The approach
is applied by employing the formal method Event-B [17]
and its support platform Rodin [18]. A typical specification
Fig. 1. The formal development paradigm
in Event-B consists of two parts: states and events. A state
is a mapping between names and values constrained by an
invariant. An event is responsible for transitions between one
state and another. For practical purposes, Event-B models are
split into Contexts and Machines, each describing the constant
and the variable part of the state respectively.
A. Hemodialysis process
HD is a treatment for kidney failure that uses a machine
to send the patient’s blood through a filter, called a dialyzer,
for extracorporeal removal of waste products. The blood is
taken through the arterial access of the patient’s body. The
blood then travels through a tube that takes it to the dialyzer.
Inside the dialyzer, the blood flows through thin fibers that
filter out wastes and extra fluid using dialysate, a chemical
substance that is used in HD to draw fluids and toxins out and
to supply electrolytes and other chemicals to the bloodstream.
The cleaned blood is then recycled back to the patient through
the venous access. A vascular access lets large amounts of
blood flow continuously during HD treatments to filter as
much blood as possible per treatment. A specific amount of
blood is conducted through the machine every minute. The
working principle of HD machines is depicted by Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Working principle of HD machines
B. Model development
1) Specification step: The model has been developed using
the following pattern:
1) Synchronize each requirement with a refinement step,
2) Distinguish and specify the static and dynamic elements
of the requirement in the context and the machine of the
related refinement respectively,
3) Introduce the safety properties expressed in the require-
ment as machine invariants,
4) Introduce the monitoring events.
The following is an example of how the requirements of the
HD machine case study are specified in the Event-B model.
Requirement: If the system is in the preparation mode
and performs priming or rinsing or if the system is in the
therapy mode and if the dialysate temperature exceeds
the maximum temperature of 41◦C, then the software
shall disconnect the dialyser from the dialysate within
60 seconds and execute an alarm signal.
We first initiate a context that defines requirement-related
static data such as modes, operations, and alarms. Then the
corresponding machine of the refinement is specified. It con-
tains several variables and invariants. The following invariants
inv1 and inv2 specify the related safety requirements.
inv1 softwareMode = Preparation ∧ (operation = Priming ∨ operation = Rinsing)
∧ dialysateTemperature > 41 ⇒
dialyserState = {Dialysate 7→ DialyserDisconnected} ∧
dialyserDisconnectionTime < 60 ∧ alarm = ALM377
inv2 softwareMode = Therapy ∧ dialysateTemperature > 41 ⇒
dialyserState = {Dialysate 7→ DialyserDisconnected} ∧
dialyserDisconnectionTime < 60 ∧ alarm = ALM639
Then we specify two monitoring events to capture the
behavior of the system because both events trigger different
alarms. As shown in Figure 3, the event disconnectDial-
yserPreparation is triggered when the software is in the
preparation mode and the temperature of the dialysate rises to
more than 41◦C during the operation. However, if the software
is in the therapy mode while the same thing happens, then the
other monitoring event is triggered.
Event disconnectDialyserPreparation
Where
softwareMode = Preparation ∧ dialysateTemperature > 41 ∧
(operation = Priming ∨ operation = Rinsing) ∧
dialyserState = {Dialysate 7→ DialyserConnected} ∧
dialyserDisconnectionTime < 60
Then
dialyserState := {Dialysate 7→ DialyserDisconnected} ∧
alarm := ALM377 ∧ dialyserDisconnectionTime := 0
End
Fig. 3. Event disconnectDialyserPreparation
An additional event dialyserDisconnecitonClock is also
specified to monitor the timing constraint of the requirement.
The tick of the clock is modeled as N that increments
dialyserDisconnectionTime by 1 (second).
2) Verification step: Verification of a model is achieved
when it is proven that the model is free from specifica-
tion errors and inconsistencies. Our fully-proven specification
ensures that the model is consistent, well-defined and its
events preserve its invariants. Additionally, we also prove that
concrete events in later refinement steps maintain invariants of
the abstract refinements, maintain abstraction invariants, and,
when appropriate, decrease variants monotonically.
Temporal properties (safety and liveness) of the system are
checked by a combination of theorem proving, model checking
and animation. Using theorem proving, we proved that safety
invariants are preserved by the behavior of the system, the
system is non-divergent, i.e., new events do not take control
forever by preventing events from the abstract models from
happening, and the system preserves enabledness, i.e., if an
event is enabled at an abstract level then it is also enabled at
the concrete level. Using model checking, we ensured that
legal states of the model are reachable, specified formulas
are satisfiable and the model does not contain any deadlock.
Using animation, we successfully checked that system traces
eventually reach their intended final states.
3) Validation step: Validation of a model is achieved when
it is demonstrated that the model is free from requirements
errors and reflects the stakeholders’ wishes adequately. The
most common way to validate a specification in the Event-
B method is to animate the specification by invoking its
operational semantics to inspect its behavior.
For animation and model checking of our specification,
we have used the ProB tool [19] that supports automated
consistency checking of Event-B machines via constraint
solving techniques. Animation using ProB worked very well.
We created several behavioral scenarios and executed them
accordingly to demonstrate the behavior of the system to
stakeholders. The ProB tool assisted us in finding potential
invariant problems and their improvement by generating coun-
terexamples whenever an invariant violation is discovered.
ProB also helped us in improving invariant expressions by
providing hints for strengthening invariants each time an
invariant was modified or a new proof was generated by the
Rodin platform. We corrected more errors during specification
modeling and reviewing than during discharging proofs and
animation.
4) Code generation step: At the last refinement step, when
the specification is sufficiently detailed, we extract the pro-
graming language code out of it. This is the result of the
translation process that converts the B code into a sequential
programing language code that runs on the given hardware.
Our target language is C. We use the EB2All tool [15] for the
translation purpose.
IV. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This letter focuses on the rigorous development of a
software-controlled safety-critical AMD responsible for renal
replacement therapy. Our employed approach successfully
enabled us to specify and analyze various critical components
of HD machines at different abstraction levels. Our approach
also enabled us to detect and correct errors and omissions
close to the point of their introduction. The formal Event-B
method supported by the Eclipse-based open source Rodin tool
has also lent itself to the development of such systems. We
have found Event-B an adequate method for the modeling and
analysis of critical medical devices. Its refinement principles
and V&V mechanisms provide all the elements that are
necessary for the safe development of AMDs and are in full
accordance with IEC standards and FDA guidelines.
However, during the development, we also faced several
challenges. For example, sophisticated tools and elaborated
guidelines for managing the complexity of growing models by
decomposition are missing in Event-B and Rodin. There is also
no implicit notion of time in Event-B, although this will be
necessary for an elegant expression of timing properties which
play a critical role in medical devices. Currently, we resort to
ProB for proving various temporal properties of the system,
but ProB often fails (at the detailed level of refinements) due
to the state space enumeration and explosion problems. In
our opinion, a standard and more natural way is required
to specify and prove that temporal properties of the system
are preserved by Event-B refinements. Finally, a tool that is
able to generate ready-to-deploy machine code from Event-
B formal models is also missing; currently available tools
can not do this. The notable problems with these tools is
that the Event-B model must be restricted to a well-defined
subset in order to generate C code and a formal proof that the
translation process preserves the safety properties of the model
is missing. Extensions of available code generation tools in
these directions is an issue for future work.
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